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ABSTRACT
For some crimes the entire law enforcement process can now 
be automated. No humans are needed to detect the crime, identify the 
perpetrator, or impose punishment. While automated systems are 
cheap and efficient, governments and citizens must look beyond these 
obvious savings as manual labor is replaced by robots and 
computers.  
Inefficiency and indeterminacy have significant value in 
automated law enforcement systems and should be preserved. 
Humans are inefficient, yet more capable of ethical and 
contextualized decision-making than automated systems. Inefficiency 
is also an effective safeguard against perfectly enforcing laws that 
were created with implicit assumptions of leniency and discretion. 
This Article introduces a theory of inefficiently automated law
enforcement built around the idea that those introducing or 
increasing automation in one part of an automated law enforcement 
system should ensure that inefficiency and indeterminacy are 
preserved or increased in other parts of the system.  
A theory of governance is critical for those who implement and 
administer automated law enforcement systems. Without it, systems 
become unmoored from ethics. Ironically, failure to responsibly 
automate law enforcement risks creating systems that actually 
undermine law and democracy. One way to preserve ethics in 
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automated law enforcement systems is to preserve ethical actors, 
inefficiency and all. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF AUTOMATION
While it may sound like science fiction, the automation of law 
enforcement is already here. Knightscope, a Sunnyvale-based 
robotics company, has designed a robot to support law enforcement 
personnel.1 USA Today reporter Marco della Cava compares K5, a 
300-pound robot, to a conflation of two other well-known 
Hollywood robots: R2-D2 and Wall-E.2 In contrast to these popular 
                                                     
1. See KNIGHTSCOPE, http://www.knightscope.com/about.html (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2016). 
2. Marco della Cava, Change Agents: William Li’s Robot Wants to Police 
You, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
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cinema icons, however, Knightscope designed K5 for a specific law 
enforcement function—a hardwired and multi-wheeled Dirty Harry.3
Della Cava writes: “[T]he robot’s friendly vibe masks the serious 
intent of the company’s CEO, William Li: to develop an ever-
growing army of K5s that would roam shopping malls, corporate 
campuses and other public places with a mission to collect and 
analyze data, and tip off law enforcement to potential issues.”4
K5, which can travel up to 18 mph, has the capacity to scan 
1,500 license plates a minute, a vast improvement in speed and 
efficiency over its human counterpart.5 While this seemingly benign 
mission of data collection and analysis—performed in the appealing 
trappings of a space-aged mall cop—might sound like a positive 
trend in leveraging technology to enhance public welfare and 
efficiency while decreasing cost (its estimated cost is $6.25 per hour 
of operation6), we must consider the legal implications and social 
impact of such an endeavor.7 Addressing what he calls “robophobia,” 
Knightscope CEO William Santana Li writes in his blog:  
[A]lthough it may be natural for folks to fear what lies ahead, it can [be 
more] exciting and productive to imagine the possibilities—and make 
them happen for the benefit of society as a whole. That is exactly what we 
are doing at Knightscope—an honorable mission to reduce crime by 50%.8
The benefits that robotic technology will bring to law enforcement—
particularly in the areas of efficiency and cost savings—are 
theoretically impressive; however, employment of these technologies 
without careful consideration poses a distinct danger to our civil 
liberties and can have detrimental effects on society.9
                                                                                                               
2014/01/26/knightscope-k5-police-robot/4018047. See also Masahiro Mori’s 
“Uncanny Valley,” originally published in 1970 and officially translated into 
English in 2012, which explores the positive and sometimes repulsive aspects of 
robot aesthetics due to their similarity to humans. Masahiro Mori, The Uncanny 
Valley, IEEE ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION MAG., June 2012, at 98 (Karl F. 
MacDorman & Norri Kageki trans.). 
3. See della Cava, supra note 2. 
4. Id.
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. As a point of comparison, $6.25 per hour for K5 is less than the current 
$7.25 per hour federal minimum wage in the United States. See Minimum Wage 
Laws in the States - January 1, 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ 
whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). 
8. William Santana Li, Why Are We Robophobic?, KNIGHTSCOPE,
http://knightscope.com/media.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).  
9. We note that a society where everyone is surveilled is a society where 
everyone is presumed guilty at the outset. Mr. Li wants to “prevent” crime, but in 
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Enhanced automated capability raises some important 
questions. What, if anything, is novel about automated law 
enforcement systems? How much authority should we bestow upon 
these automated systems? To what extent are technologists and 
policy makers able to produce a system capable of exercising 
discretion and accounting for context in the same way humans can? 
Even if an automated law enforcement system is capable of 
achieving total legal compliance by the populous, is perfect 
enforcement of a law ever desirable? Prudence is therefore necessary 
as we embrace seemingly inevitable force multipliers in our brave 
new world of enhanced automated law enforcement. 
Enforcement of the law has thus far been largely a manual 
process, one moderated by the discretion of human judgment and 
finite human resources, which were focused on priority offenses. 
Relatively speaking, this process is inefficient. Increasingly however, 
the law enforcement process can be automated partially (and, in 
some cases, completely) from surveillance to punishment. Red-light 
cameras and speeding tickets automatically issued by drones display 
the potential for automated enforcement in its early stages. The 
ubiquity of networked sensor devices, increases in processing power 
at lower cost, demands for revenue, and desires to increase public 
safety and security are seemingly leading to an era of productized 
automated law enforcement systems.10 If we want, inefficiency can 
be a thing of the past. 
Yet, policy makers are unsure how to properly regulate 
automated systems.11 This is a problem because it seems that 
automated law enforcement systems will inevitably become more 
powerful and effective. If left unchecked, automated law 
enforcement systems could cause significant social harm despite 
                                                                                                               
reality he is just developing a means to more efficiently “detect” crimes. Will the 
one result in the other?
10. See LISA SHAY ET AL., CONFRONTING AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT
(2012), http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Shay-EtAl-
ConfrontingAutomatedLawEnf.pdf; see also Cyrus Farivar, Perfect Enforcement: 
On the Ground in the Red Light Camera Wars, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:00 
PM) [hereinafter Farivar, Perfect Enforcement], http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/12/perfect-enforcement-on-the-ground-in-the-red-light-camera-wars; Cyrus 
Farivar, Arizona Town Mounts Dozens of New License Plate Readers in Fake 
Cactuses, ARS TECHNICA (May 8, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/05/arizona-town-mounts-dozens-of-new-license-plate-readers-in-fake-
cactuses. 
11. For an example of the general uncertainty, see Farivar, Perfect 
Enforcement, supra note 10. 
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attempting to improve public welfare. Anecdotes of partially or fully 
automated law enforcement, such as license plate readers and crowd-
control robots, are becoming increasingly common. The 
implementation of these systems has been haphazard and 
atheoretical. There is no guiding principle for policy makers and 
enforcement officers to ensure that automated law enforcement 
systems fulfill their objective in a way that respects privacy and civil 
liberties. Yet these same systems continue to proliferate in our day-
to-day lives.  
This Article aims to remedy the dearth of guidance by 
developing a theory of inefficiently automated law enforcement. The 
central premise of this theory is that inefficiency and indeterminacy 
(usually in the form of human actors with free will) are vital 
components within the law enforcement process and should be 
conserved in some form. When one aspect of a law enforcement 
process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is automated to increase 
efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and indeterminacy should 
generally be proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the 
process to prevent harms from automation. In short, we argue that 
inefficiency and human intervention should be conserved in 
automated enforcement systems through reallocation.  
Making the discrete aspects of an automated system of law 
enforcement symbiotic through this conservation principle has at 
least two advantages. First, it forces policy makers to consider 
enforcement systems holistically, which will reduce internal conflict 
and unintended consequences. Additionally, it designates 
indeterminacy and inefficiency as necessary and desirable 
components of any automated law enforcement process, not 
weaknesses in the system, as they first might appear. Rather, they are 
essential checks and balances to maintain a civil and sustainable rule 
of law system.  
In order to help develop this theory of conservation, this Article 
also imposes order on the seemingly haphazard milieu of unmanned 
regulation by providing an end-to-end analysis of automatic law 
enforcement systems. In Part I of this Article, we propose a revised 
taxonomy of three discrete aspects of an automated law enforcement 
system, conceptualized as surveillance, analysis, and action. A 
deeper understanding of each sub-component, and the larger process 
as a whole, allows for more effective analysis of automated law 
enforcement proposals. In Part II of this Article, we delineate 
specific, undesirable societal outcomes stemming from unchecked, 
ungoverned automation of surveillance, analysis, and action. In 
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Part III of this Article, we develop our conservation theory of 
automated law enforcement by explicating the value of inefficiency 
and indeterminism and the possible harms from automation to be 
avoided through conservation. We then explore how the theory 
might be applied using several scenarios. This Article concludes that 
while increases in automation seem inevitable, law enforcement 
agencies should carefully maintain checks and balances with 
appropriate applications of inefficiency or indeterminism. 
A theory of governance is critical for those who implement and 
administer automated law enforcement systems. Without it, systems 
become unmoored from ethics in the pursuit of efficiency. Failure to 
responsibly automate law enforcement risks creating systems that 
undermine law and democracy.  
I. A REVISED TAXONOMY OF AUTOMATING LAW ENFORCEMENT
We have used the concept of “automating laws” as shorthand in 
previous research for the automation of various parts of the legal 
process.12 We define automated law enforcement (ALE) as any 
computer-based system that uses input from unattended sensors to 
algorithmically determine that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed and then takes some responsive action, such as to warn 
the subject or inform the appropriate law enforcement agency. 
Additionally, these systems will be capable of automatically 
imposing some form of punishment. In order to apply conservation 
theory to ALE, each aspect of the legal process must be broken down 
into its constituent parts and critically examined to determine the 
risks and rewards of automation.  
At the highest level of abstraction, we define three major actors 
interacting in three major parts of a process. That model consists of 
(1) a subject, the person monitored who may or may not commit a 
crime; (2) law enforcement agencies that conduct surveillance, 
analysis, and enforcement; and (3) a judicial system that determines 
guilt and imposes punishment in certain cases. There are also 
feedback mechanisms that relay warnings and notices of crimes back 
to the subject and to the designated agency. In a perfect case, the 
interplay among these actors results in criminals being caught, 
accurately judged, and fairly punished. In reality, the results are far 
                                                     
12. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10. 
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messier.13 The three major components of automated law 
enforcement include (1) surveillance, (2) analysis (resulting in a 
determination of guilt or innocence), and (3) action (resulting in 
punishment or freedom). Automation anywhere in these three areas 
can trigger the considerations listed later in this Article. 
Surveillance includes all actions to detect that a crime has been 
committed, such as eyewitness or victim reports, observations by 
police officers (or private security personnel), and electro-
mechanical sensors (such as cameras, radar guns, and GPS trackers), 
which may or may not be operated by law enforcement agencies. 
The technology and systems we suggest provide data readily 
available to law enforcement; however, other systems that might 
require judicial approval may also provide significant surveillance 
data, such as smart homes,14 private CCTV systems, or mobile 
devices. A comprehensive listing of all surveillance measures is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the defining characteristics we 
suggest—speed (human or machine), unique subject identifier, and 
location information—may be applied to other technologies, as 
desired. In previous research, we identified location, time, tracking, 
velocity, and identification as all being subject to automated 
surveillance.15 We also suggest the study of future candidate 
attributes, including more accurate time and location measurements, 
accuracy identification rates, and percent coverage of a given area.16
Surveillance ends with the determination that a crime may have been 
committed. This determination and all evidence are passed to the 
next stage—analysis. 
                                                     
13. The problem is compounded by the use of automation in an attempt to 
gain efficiencies at various points in the process. Such automation can be a single 
step in a given process, as in the case of a speed gun used by a police officer to 
identify the speed of a passing motorist, after which largely manual processes are 
used to proceed. However, an end-to-end automated system may be constructed in 
an attempt to automate virtually all aspects of law enforcement for a given law or set 
of laws with little to no human oversight. As an example, consider a red-light 
camera system that identifies violations, performs license plate recognition, 
conducts driving record retrieval, employs algorithmic adjudication, and 
automatically prints and mails citations to vehicle owners, all with only a cursory 
inspection performed by a human law enforcement official to limit errors.  
14. For one example of a smart home package, see AT&T DIGITAL LIFE,
https://my-digitallife.att.com/learn (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). See also Tanya 
Bodell, Why Google Bought Nest for $3.2 Billion, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (Feb. 25, 
2014), http://www.elp.com/articles/print/volume-92/issue-1/columns/why-google-
bought-nest-for-3-2-billion.html. 
15. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10. 
16. Id. 
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The analysis stage consists of actions taken to identify the 
alleged perpetrator and to determine guilt or innocence of the 
suspect. These actions can include human investigation, human 
interrogation of suspects or witnesses (possibly augmented with 
technology), computer analysis of surveillance data, and manual or 
automated “mining” of multiple datasets to establish connections 
between individuals or between an individual and an action in the 
crime (“data mining”).17 The analysis stage also includes a 
determination as to whether the case should proceed to trial and, if 
so, includes the trial itself. The end of the analysis stage is a 
determination of guilt or innocence for each defendant and a 
sentencing decision. 
The action stage consists of carrying out the sentence or 
administrative action, via embarrassment or shaming,18 delivering a 
ticket, manual or automatic monitoring of probation (e.g., using a 
GPS bracelet), incarceration, or in extreme cases, execution.19
                                                     
17. The NSA is a natural example. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive 
Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 10, 2006, 10:38 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm; 
Alexander Dryer, How the NSA Does “Social Network Analysis,” SLATE (May 15, 
2006, 6:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2006/ 
05/how_the_nsa_does_social_network_analysis.html. Other examples include 
Mudhakar Srivatsa & Mike Hicks, Deanonymizing Mobility Traces: Using Social 
Networks as a Side-Channel, in ACM SIGSAC, CSS’12: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2012 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 628 
(2012), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2382262, and Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly 
Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in IEEE COMPUTER 
SOCIETY, SP ‘08: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY 111 (2008), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1398064 (detailing the 
famous Netflix Prize dataset deanonymization). See also PREDPOL,
https://www.predpol.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2016); Mark Gibbs, Predicting Crime 
with Big Data . . . Welcome to “Minority Report” for Real, NETWORK WORLD (Sept. 
20, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2686051/big-data-
business-intelligence/predicting-crime-with-big-data-welcome-to-minority-report-
for-real.html. 
18. See Lynn DeBruin, ‘Shame’ Punishments Increasing: Judges Order 
Ponytail Cutting, Sleeping in Doghouse, Wearing Embarrassing Signs, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 26, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/26/shame-
punishments-judge-orders-ponytail_n_1627010.html. Consider also the use of 
offender registries, such as the National Sex Offender Database, DRU SJODIN NAT’L
SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, http://www.nsopr.gov (last visited Jan. 14, 2016), and 
online arrest search systems, for example BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFF.,
https://www.sheriff.org/apps/arrest (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). 
19. See Ralph Kirkland Gable & Robert S. Gable, Electronic Monitoring: 
Positive Intervention Strategies, 69 FED. PROB. J. 21 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=210867. For a detailed walkthrough including 
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Consider this taxonomy in the context of red-light cameras. 
Sensors in the form of cameras are activated when a vehicle enters 
an intersection after the light has turned red (often with a “grace 
period” of 0.1 to 0.2 seconds):  
These pictures document the date, time, and speed of the vehicle. Red 
light cameras also typically capture a picture of the vehicle entering the 
intersection and a picture of the vehicle in the intersection, both during the 
red phase. Individual jurisdictions or camera vendors then process the 
pictures and issue the citation to the owner of the offending vehicle.20
Depending on the specific law the system attempts to enforce, each 
of these stages in the taxonomy is amenable to automation to varying 
degrees, ranging from effectively impossible using today’s 
technology to easily accomplished. In some cases, the entire process, 
from start to finish, may be automated. For example, red-light 
cameras (automated surveillance) might trigger on a car crossing the 
intersection when the light is red, which would then look up the 
license plate number to find the address of the registered owner 
(automated analysis) and then print and mail a ticket to the registered 
owner’s address (automated action).
We anticipate such systems will increase in efficiency over 
time as sensing, networking, and processing technologies improve. 
The rate at which such systems are fielded, employed, and upgraded 
in practice will depend on several factors, including financial cost 
(and potentially financial incentives), performance, usability, and 
acceptability. However, we believe the ultimate driver will be 
demands of national, regional, and local policy makers; law 
enforcement officials; or the public for greater use, efficiencies, and 
cost savings.  
                                                                                                               
discussion of the ticket (notice of liability), see City of Yonkers Red Light Camera 
Safety Program, CITY OF YONKERS, NY, http://www.cityofyonkers.com/government/ 
departments/parking-violations-bureau/red-light-cameras-how-it-works-locations 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2016). To be fair, much of the automation occurs at the lower 
end of the scale. However, autonomous weapon systems are technically feasible and 
examples have been in use since the Cold War, so execution is possible (more or 
less) to automate. See Michael Carl Haas, Autonomous Weapon Systems: The 
Military’s Smartest Toys?, NAT’L INT., http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ 
autonomous-weapon-systems-the-militarys-smartest-toys-11708 (last visited Jan. 14, 
2016). 
20. KIMBERLY ECCLES ET AL., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., NCHRP REPORT 729: AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT FOR SPEEDING AND RED 
LIGHT RUNNING 3-4 (2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_ 
rpt_729.pdf. 
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The degrees of automation will vary between contexts, but 
there are examples of how levels of automation might be created. For 
example, consider the Society of Automotive Engineers 
International’s Levels of Driving Automation for On-Road 
Vehicles.21 From Level 0 (No Automation) and Level 1 (Driver 
Assistance) to Level 4 (High Automation) and Level 5 (Full 
Automation), the model plots four different variables: (1) Execution 
of Steering and Level of Acceleration/Deceleration; (2) Monitoring 
of Driving Environment; (3) Fallback Performance of Dynamic 
Driving Task; and (4) System Capability (driving modes).22
Levels of automation might look similar for surveillance, 
analysis, or enforcement of traffic laws. Levels of automation could 
be based on variables such as whether humans conduct surveillance, 
process or analyze data, or review decisions; whether any of these 
actions are at fully automated machine speed or slower based on 
degrees of human involvement; and whether humans are physically 
present at the location of surveillance, analysis, or enforcement. 
From the perspective of law enforcement and government 
officials, improvements to automated law enforcement systems are 
not guaranteed. Citizens may petition for the limitation or removal of 
automated law enforcement systems, and many have already done 
so.23 Subjects or their supporters may employ a wide range of 
countermeasures, especially technical and policy countermeasures 
that reduce efficiency of a system.24 Technical countermeasures 
would strive to deny, degrade, deceive, corrupt, usurp, or destroy 
sensing, networking, storage, and processing capabilities of the 
system.25 Policy countermeasures undermine the legal authorities, 
which allow use of the system by legitimate entities.26
                                                     
21. Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor 
Vehicle Automated Driving Systems, SAE INT’L, http://standards.sae.org/j3016_ 
201401/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). 
22. Id.
23. Cyrus Farivar, Iowa City to Ban Red-Light Cameras, Drones, and 
License Plate Readers Too, ARS TECHNICA (June 4, 2013, 7:45 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/iowa-city-to-ban-not-only-red-light-
cameras-but-drones-license-plate-readers-too/. 
24. Lisa A. Shay et al., Beyond Sunglasses and Spray Paint: A Taxonomy of 
Surveillance Countermeasures, in IEEE, 2013 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY (ISTAS) 191 (2013). 
25. Noah Shachtman, ‘Degrade, Disrupt, Deceive’: U.S. Talks Openly 
About Hacking Foes, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2012, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/degrade-disrupt-deceive/. 
26. See Rachel Weiner, Cuccinelli to Work on NSA Class-Action Lawsuit,
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/ 
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It is important to conceptualize law enforcement as a process 
with discrete parts for purposes of automation. Key stakeholders 
with the power to implement law enforcement systems might not be 
aware of the ripple effects that automating one aspect of a system 
might have on the other aspects. For example, if surveillance is 
automated, much more information can be gleaned from that 
surveillance at a reduced transaction cost. Should analysis of this 
dramatically larger pile of information also be automated in order to 
keep up? If the decision-making process is automated and flags a 
significantly higher number of legal violations, should enforcement 
actions also be automated in order to avoid a systemic apathy to 
identified crimes? In the Part below, we explore potential social costs 
of automation at each point in an automated law enforcement system 
as well as holistically.  
II. SOCIAL COSTS OF AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
A. Surveillance 
The social cost of automated surveillance is potentially 
profound, but our society has already been subjected to it with 
increasing scope and depth over the past several years. Until 
relatively recently, significant and collective outcry has failed to 
emerge. Certainly social activists and “robophobes” have always 
raised concern at the potential Orwellian turn of automated law 
enforcement in our everyday lives; these voices normally have fallen 
on society’s margins, however, and rarely have they voiced a 
collective sentiment.27 This passive acceptance seems to have 
                                                                                                               
cuccinelli-to-work-on-nsa-class-action-lawsuit/2014/01/06/1832ee22-7720-11e3-
8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html; James Warren, White House Task Force Report on 
NSA Spying Recommends Sweeping Reforms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18, 2013, 
6:00 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/white-house-release-report-
reforms-nsa-spying-article-1.1551792. 
27. Relatively unknown groups such as the National Motorists Association 
provide information for red-light camera activists. Red-Light Cameras, NAT’L
MOTORISTS ASS’N, https://www.motorists.org/issues/red-light-cameras/ (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2016). About the National Motorists Association, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N,
https://www.motorists.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). One recent success 
occurred in Arlington, Texas, where activists succeeded in collecting more than 
11,000 signatures to force city leaders to put the issue on the ballot. See Anna A. 
Tinsley, Red-Light Cameras May Soon Be Shut Off in Arlington, THE STAR-
TELEGRAM (May 9, 2015), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/ 
election/article20602842.html. Fifty-nine percent of voters supported banning the 
cameras. See id.; see also Texas Tea Party Takes On Red Light Cameras, and $18-
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changed recently with the intense media focus on Edward Snowden’s 
leaked classified information about the National Security Agency’s 
global automated surveillance system.28 The body politic the system 
was designed and employed to protect now turns against it for its 
deep invasiveness and troubling secrecy.  
Consider the recent report that the United Kingdom’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) allegedly 
conducted a vast, comprehensive surveillance and recording of 
Yahoo webcam users’ online activities in an aptly titled operation 
named Optic Nerve.29 Reporters Spencer Ackerman and James Ball, 
pulling from Snowden’s leaked NSA documents, reported the 
following:  
GCHQ files dating between 2008 and 2010 explicitly state that a 
surveillance program codenamed Optic Nerve collected still images of 
Yahoo webcam chats in bulk and saved them to agency databases, 
regardless of whether individual users were an intelligence target or not. 
In one six-month period in 2008 alone, the agency collected webcam 
imagery—including substantial quantities of sexually explicit 
communications—from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts 
globally.30  
This automated surveillance, ostensibly conducted in the 
interest of national security, jeopardizes the privacy of millions of 
citizens across the globe.31 The digital gaze—previously limited by 
the human eye in scope and duration—now has the potential for 
deepening and widening penetration, as well as increasingly long-
term archivability for future law enforcement analysis and 
deployment. 
U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, equated 
the controversial archiving of private Internet communication to the 
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collection of books in a library; most of those books will never be 
opened, he stated, just as most of the archived email traffic will
never be directly read by a human analyst.32 “So the task for us in the 
interest of preserving security and preserving civil liberties and 
privacy,” says Clapper, “is to be as precise as we possibly can be 
when we go in that library and look for the books that we need to 
open up and actually read.”33
B. Analysis 
Removing the human element from the analysis phase is likely 
the most troubling to critics of a completely automated law 
enforcement system. For it is human discretion—the intrinsic value 
of mitigation and extenuation—that would be missing without a 
human in “the loop.”
Philosophers have long asserted that a law, no matter how well-
intentioned or clearly stated, cannot be appropriate for all people in 
all circumstances. Consider Plato’s analysis of government in The 
Statesman:
[A] law would never be capable of comprehending with precision for all 
simultaneously the best and the most just and enjoining the best, for the 
dissimilarities of human beings and of their actions and the fact that 
almost none of the human things is ever at rest do not allow any art 
whatsoever to declare in any case anything simple about all and over the 
entire time.34  
Given that laws must be adapted, interpreted, and even 
replaced, as times and circumstances change, it is clear that analysis 
leading to decisions of guilt or innocence should not be left entirely 
to an automated, inflexible system. Humans are ideally suited for 
performing this adaptation and interpretation, since humans are the 
beings whose actions are affected and regulated by these laws. In 
contrast, the actions of computers or robots are governed by 
deterministic programs, which are rarely designed to adapt or change 
and that receive neither benefit nor harm from a law, whether just or 
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unjust or whether applied fairly or unfairly.35 While ultimately these 
algorithms are designed by humans, they require all contextual 
decisions to be made ex ante, thus limiting the ability for human 
discretion to mitigate seemingly unjust or excessive enforcement of a 
particular law. Therefore, the analysis portion of the automated law 
enforcement system, which concludes with a determination of guilt 
or innocence, must at some point be tempered ex ante or 
simultaneously with automation by human judgment. 
C. Action 
As automated surveillance increases in power and scope and 
crime detection is further perfected, is our legal system justified 
tolerating criminality by intentionally ignoring known violations of 
the law? Does perfect detection obligate perfect enforcement or risk 
undermining the rule of law, an essential component of our social 
fabric? Or should flexibility or a level of toleration be engineered 
into the automated system so that illegal behavior isn’t detected and 
then purposefully ignored? If so, what principles allow designers to 
shape this forgiveness ex ante? At the root of these questions is the 
legitimacy of toleration within our legal system.36 As we will argue 
below, perhaps simply preserving inefficiency and indeterminacy as 
a matter of design and procedure will help avoid these social costs 
without having to set principles of forgiveness in stone. 
Slovenian Marxist philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek 
asserts in The Plague of Fantasies that:  
[F]ar from undermining the rule of the Law, its ‘transgression’ in fact 
serves as its ultimate support. So it is not only that transgression relies on, 
presupposes, the Law it transgresses; rather, the reverse case is much more 
pertinent: Law itself relies on its inherent transgression, so that when we 
suspend this transgression, the Law itself disintegrates.37  
While Žižek may overstate the importance of transgression, or 
disobedience, for the stability of our legal system, the capacity to 
transcend judicial boundaries is inarguably essential to the 
establishment of those constraints in the first place. Why else would 
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legal restrictions exist? They would be unnecessary and redundant in 
a world in which automation prevents transgression. Intent, criminal 
or not, would thereby be trumped preemptively and always. Such a 
world strips human agency from us by disallowing deviancy and 
rebellion; risk-taking; and that justified, isolated breach. A safer, 
more docile world we would have perhaps, but absent the free will 
that necessitates governance in the first place, we should question the 
foundation of those very systems that strip away our ability to 
challenge codified legal constraints.  
Equally important to this need to be free to disobey—to 
transgress—is, of course, our desire and, indeed, our innate need to 
choose to obey.38 If compliance as a forced function reaches its fully 
automated capacity of total enforcement, then we can no longer be 
deemed a “law-abiding society,” for instead we would be 
imprisoned—not abiding by choice—within an artificially 
constrained world, potentially constrained in both our public and 
private spheres. What then of responsible citizenry? 
In his book Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society 
Needs to Thrive, Bruce Schneier echoes many social advocates 
before him when he writes that law breaking is at times necessary for 
social change.39 In fact, law breaking under certain circumstances 
might be just as critical to our social fabric as abiding by the law. We 
might consider such famous and morally justified breaches of the 
law by noted activists like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma 
Ghandi.40 In his highly influential essay “Civil Disobedience,” Henry 
David Thoreau writes, “[I]f [the machine of government] is of such a 
nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then
I say, break the law.”41 Thoreau was responding, in part, to his moral 
outrage against slavery and the Mexican–American War. Imagine a 
society in which morally justified civil disobedience like Thoreau’s 
is made impossible by perfected surveillance and enforcement, when 
transgression rises to the level of a moral imperative yet is stymied 
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by the totality of our brave new system, an unchallengeable 
“machine of government.”42 How might this affect our individual and 
collective ability—and obligation—to confront, in full, government-
sanctioned abuses or missteps?  
The benefits of automated law enforcement in the form of 
increased efficiency and consistency are readily apparent and 
discussed below. In theory, better enforcement reduces crime by 
increasing the likelihood of punishment, among other things. More 
consistent decisions through automation can mitigate the harmful 
effects of enforcement bias and related abuse of discretion harms.43
Citizens are, in theory, all held to a more consistent standard, 
resulting in a harmonization regarding the particular boundaries and 
interpretation of the law.  
But it is critical to consider carefully the long-term and 
nuanced implications of ceding human decision-making to human-
derived, but computer-driven, algorithms that seemingly streamline, 
simplify, and reduce the cost of more traditional methods but reduce 
human agency at all junctures. The imperfections of current 
automated law enforcement systems most certainly are considerable 
and should cause the prudent critic to pause; the perfected system, if 
even possible and whatever that “ideal” system may look like, can be 
equally troubling, however, since we naturally cringe at the concept 
of omniscient governmental control due to the value we place on 
freedom and privacy. 
III. A THEORY OF INEFFICIENTLY AUTOMATED LAW ENFORCEMENT
The central premise of our theory is that inefficiency and 
indeterminacy (in the form of human actors with free will) are vital 
components within the law enforcement process and should be 
conserved in some form. When one aspect of a law enforcement 
process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is automated to increase 
efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and indeterminacy should 
generally be proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the 
process to prevent harms from automation. Automating surveillance, 
analysis, or action makes it important to ensure that inefficiency or 
indeterminism is correspondingly preserved or introduced into the 
rest of the system to protect social welfare and prevent harm. In 
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short, we argue that inefficiency and human intervention should be 
conserved in automated enforcement systems through reallocation.  
In previous research, we identified potential problems with 
automated law enforcement systems, including concerns about 
inaccuracy, bias, due process, privacy, inflexibility, over-
enforcement, and abuse.44 Many of these concerns are viable because 
automation decreases the transaction cost of surveillance of 
individuals, the analysis of that surveilled data, and actions based 
upon that analysis. In other words, the elevated concern over 
automated law enforcement is primarily due to the fact that 
efficiency brings reduced transaction costs which, in turn, 
encourages greater use of surveillance, analysis, and action 
(punishment), leading to reduced privacy, due process concerns,45
and the specter of perfect enforcement culminating in an Orwellian 
police state. 
It is important to note that we do not argue that automated 
technologies are inherently problematic. Robots and other automated 
technologies hold great promise to dramatically improve the lives of 
everyone on earth. Rather, it is at the intersection of automation and 
legal obligation where we urge caution. Automated systems enable at 
least two dramatic departures from the status quo. First, automated 
systems are highly efficient, which can reduce the cost of 
surveillance, analysis, and enforcement to negligible levels per 
incident.46 Manual surveillance, analysis, and enforcement require 
manpower, money, and time. Automation can be centralized, cheap, 
and virtually instantaneous. Second, automated systems are 
44. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 10; SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
45. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249 (2008). 
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completely predictable. They will react to the same input in the exact 
same way every single time. In this way, they are determinate 
because there is no room for choice in a given model.47 Thus, 
automated law enforcement holds the promise of efficiency and 
consistency. We anticipate that these advantages will motivate and 
be used to justify the adoption of automated technologies. 
We assert that inefficiency and indeterminacy in the form of 
human intervention and deliberate technological restriction are 
relative virtues of our current law enforcement system, not a 
drawback. Not only does inefficiency and indeterminacy allow for 
more contextualized, localized, and adaptive decision-making, but 
they also help obviate the dilemma of the perfect enforcement of 
laws that were drafted with likely assumptions that enforcement 
would be resource intensive and, thus, optimize justified 
enforcement attempts.48 Although this theory might seem regressive, 
both inefficiency and indeterminacy humanize the automated law 
enforcement process and make it palatable for a free society. As a 
result, they should be accounted for and relatively conserved by 
those who would implement automated systems. In this Part, we 
discuss the virtue of inefficiency and indeterminacy and the different 
ways in which they may be created and preserved. 
A. Inefficiency 
Law enforcement is, by and large, inefficient. It costs time and 
resources for most crimes to be detected, investigated, prosecuted, 
and punished. These costs can burden law enforcement. The number 
of crimes committed is inevitably more than the number processed 
through to punishment. Standing alone, this innate inefficiency might 
appear as a flaw within the law enforcement system. However, we 
assert that it is an essential counter to the potential totality and 
flawlessness of a completely automated system. It necessarily 
disrupts and delays the rote, mechanical processing of pre-
programmed procedures thereby allowing human intervention at 
critical points in the system. 
Consider the issuance of a speeding ticket. In analog policing 
regimes, a police officer might wait in a concealed location and 
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capture a vehicle’s instantaneous speed as it passes by. If this speed 
crosses the officer’s own particular enforcement threshold, the police 
officer will stop the car, engage the driver, and potentially issue a 
ticket. However, an automated system could maintain a continuous 
flow of samples based on driving behavior and issue tickets 
accordingly. Our previous experiment demonstrated that a typical 
driver could be issued over 500 tickets in a one hour trip on a 
commuting route where there were at most two police cars stationed 
on a given day and often none at all. There are at least three different 
kinds of inefficiencies that can maintain the transaction cost of 
enforcement at desirable levels: (1) human intervention in “the 
loop”; (2) countermeasures; and (3) technical governors. 
1. Human Intervention in “The Loop” 
The process of law enforcement has historically relied heavily 
on human police, investigators, judicial officials, and correctional 
officers to function. Operating at human speed, rather than the much 
faster machine speed, law enforcement systems traditionally 
possessed inherent inefficiencies and extensive human intervention 
that greatly limited the type, extent, and duration of surveillance; 
prioritized enforcement of the law; contextualized decision-making; 
and moderated the law’s social impact. The bulk of laws on the 
books and the rich history of precedent on which today’s legal 
decisions are based spring from this analog environment and assume 
this tradition of human intervention.  
We are entering a new era when large portions of the law 
enforcement process may be automated, however, potentially with 
little to no human oversight or intervention. Enabling technologies—
such as robotics, sensors, networking, and machine learning—are 
now removing these barriers and important friction from the process. 
These advances, which promise greater efficiency and accuracy at a 
greatly reduced cost (and sometimes increased profit),49 are 
welcomed by officials in the quest for improved public safety 
through more efficient enforcement of the law. Emerging today are 
end-to-end automated law enforcement systems that include 
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surveillance, crime detection, legal processing, and punishment of 
certain laws or classes of laws, for example, red-light violations at 
intersections and violations of speed limits.50 Little has been done, 
however, to assess the social impact of human absence from the 
process. 
2. Countermeasures  
We define countermeasures to mean actions taken in response 
to perceived threats from automation of some aspect of law 
enforcement.51 Our previous analysis of automating enforcement of 
one type of law led to explorations of countermeasures of 
surveillance, the first necessary step in automating the law.52 Few 
would tolerate receiving 500 tickets during a one-hour trip, as our 
study indicated.53 Evidence already shows that an overzealous 
approach to law enforcement encourages individuals and 
organizations to take (sometimes illegal) countermeasures.54
For instance, earlier this year as a protest against the European 
Police Congress held in Berlin, German activists created a real-world 
“game” awarding points to teams who destroyed or removed 
surveillance cameras in major German cities, with bonus points for 
creative techniques.55 The likelihood and acceptability of 
countermeasures are far greater with the human actor removed from 
the process, for no longer is the citizen acting against the police 
officer, the investigator, or the court official, but instead against 
faceless technology employed against the populace, a far more 
palatable target of resistance. 
Elizabeth Joh has called countermeasures to surveillance in 
certain contexts “privacy protests.” She writes:
Ordinary American life today cannot be easily lived without being 
targeted by government surveillance. Many, if not most, people acquiesce 
to these demands for information about them, either out of acceptance or 
resignation.  
But some people object. They take steps to thwart police surveillance, 
not because they are seeking to conceal criminal acts, but out of 
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ideological belief or personal conviction. Advice on “surveillance 
defense” and counter-surveillance products is readily available on the 
internet: Use Tor to surf the internet. Encrypt your digital 
communications. Use disposable “guerilla email” addresses and 
disposable phone numbers. Avoid ordinary credit cards and choose only 
cash, prepaid debit cards, or bitcoins to make a financial trail harder to 
detect. Avoid cell phones unless they are “burners” (prepaid phones), 
“dumb phones,” or “freedom phones” from Asia that have had all tracking 
devices removed. Alternatively, hide your smartphone in an ad hoc 
Faraday cage, like a refrigerator, to avoid being tracked. Use photoblocker 
film on a license plate or a ski mask to thwart a red-light camera. Use a 
Spyfinder camera detector to see if someone is watching you. Use “spoof 
cards” that mask your identity on caller identification devices. Burn your 
garbage to hamper investigations of your financial records or the 
collection of your genetic information. Hire a professional to alter your 
digital self on the internet by erasing data or posting multiple false 
identities. At the extreme end, you could live “off the grid” and cut off all 
contact with the modern world.56
Countermeasures could play a critical role in conserving both 
inefficiency and indeterminacy in an automated system. By their 
very nature, countermeasures aim to frustrate enforcement efforts. If 
effective, they render these efforts inefficient because greater 
resources will be required to make them work. Countermeasures also 
preserve indeterminacy, at least for the surveilled, by helping ensure 
that surveillance, analysis, and enforcement are not guaranteed. 
Policy makers should be mindful of the availability and legality 
of countermeasures when automating a system. To the extent that 
countermeasures are desirable, they should not be explicitly 
prohibited. One notorious instance where perfect enforcement has 
been sought and countermeasures have been explicitly prohibited is 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) ban on 
circumventing technological copyright controls.57 The DMCA 
attempts to mandate respect for digital rights management (DRM) by 
instituting anticircumvention provisions into U.S. copyright law.58
These provisions are, “in effect, a ban on the act of circumventing or 
trafficking in devices that circumvent certain DRM systems.”59
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In some instances, countermeasures should even be explicitly 
allowed.60 Given the uncertainty in many computer crime laws, 
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, it is not entirely clear 
when countermeasures may be deployed in response to government 
surveillance, analysis, and action.61
3. Technical and Procedural Governors  
Technical governors are mechanisms created by technologies 
or regulation that reduce the capability of a sub-system within the 
automated law enforcement framework.62 For instance, law 
enforcement officials must follow the appropriate authorization 
process before they can install a wiretap.63 The limit to the number of 
phone calls monitored is determined by law, not a limitation of the 
underlying technology. Law enforcement officials must follow the 
appropriate authorization process before installing a GPS tracker on 
a suspect’s vehicle.64 Again, the limitation on tracking cars is due to a 
constraint imposed by the law, not a limitation of the technology.  
Professor Paul Ohm has proposed that privacy and 
transparency goals can be simultaneously achieved by making
information “hard but possible” to obtain.65 Harry Surden has 
likewise recognized the value in high transactional costs to protect 
privacy, noting that “[s]ociety relies upon . . . latent structural 
constraints to reliably inhibit certain unwanted conduct in a way that 
is functionally comparable to its use of law. For example, society has 
frequently depended upon the search costs involved in aggregating 
and analyzing large amounts of information to effectively protect 
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anonymity.”66 These theories for protecting privacy by imposing 
artificial transaction costs could be expanded to protect against many 
different kinds of harm made possible through automation.  
B. Indeterminacy 
The second concept that automated systems should be designed 
to preserve is indeterminacy. As a term of art, if something is 
determinate, then it has a constrained predictability. Consequently, 
indeterminate systems have fewer constraints on predictability and, 
as a result, are more random. Computer algorithms are usually 
implemented using deterministic state machines, systems where the 
transitions from state to state are uniquely determined.67 In other 
words, the algorithm will always produce the same output for a given 
input under the same conditions: If a car is detected to exceed a 
speed limit, a traffic ticket will be issued.  
While this predictability and repeatability is desirable in most 
software systems, it can be overly constraining in a legal system 
where the accused would like to account for extenuating and 
mitigating circumstances. In our previous research, we argued:  
Many crimes provide for a necessity defense for violators who can 
demonstrate that violation of the law was required to prevent harm. 
Specifically, the necessity defense has been recognized where “criminal 
action was necessary to avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be 
prevented by the statute defining the offense.” It is not difficult to imagine 
scenarios where activity in violation of the law is justified by necessity. 
For example, speeding might be justified to rush someone needing urgent 
medical care to the hospital. Reckless driving might be justified if the 
driver was avoiding obstructions in the road. Those under restraining 
orders might not be able to return home because the only route is via a
bridge that lies within the restricted area.68
Indeterminacy, defined as the condition or quality of 
uncertainty, seems a strange characteristic to be desired within the 
rule of law spectrum, yet it illuminates an essential entry point for 
humans in the automated law enforcement system. In literary studies, 
indeterminacy requires readers to interpret their own meaning when 
faced with textual uncertainty, in a sense, to create meaning from 
those elliptical moments within a text based on personal experience 
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and intuition.69 In other words, indeterminacy calls upon a reader to 
fill in meaning gaps. In law enforcement, indeterminacy recognizes 
that the data provided by a set of sensors might be incomplete, and a 
decision based solely on that data would be inaccurate or invalid. 
Thus, the human-in-the-loop is a desired insertion at moments of 
legal indeterminacy in order to complete the narrative, using 
intuition and an understanding and appreciation for the full range of 
human experience combined with legal knowledge. Indeterminacy 
ensures that the process of automated enforcement is extended and 
iterative in order to add meaning and certainty to the information 
collected, analyzed, and acted upon.  
It is also worth noting that certain human characteristics, such 
as empathy, are difficult to program into systems. Thus, in the 
process of becoming determinate, programmers code intangibles like 
empathy out of the system. Perhaps one of the most vivid reasons to 
preserve uncertainty via humans is the preservation of these 
intangibles that can help produce outcomes that might be desirable, 
even if those outcomes constitute a deviation from predictable 
standard protocol.  
In practical terms, if automation is increased at one point in the 
automated law enforcement system, indeterminacy would be 
achieved by human intervention “downstream,” or after the point at 
which the automation was increased. If surveillance is automated, 
keep humans in “the loop” to review or interpret the surveillance 
data, or at least data flagged as an indicator of suspicious activity. If 
analysis is automated, have a human review the analysis decision. If 
enforcement is automated, maintain a human-mediated appeals 
process. 
C. The Benefits of Conservation  
1. Contextualized Decisions 
One of the most difficult aspects of designing an automated 
system is that all decisions about how the system will respond in any 
given situation must be made ex ante. In our previous research, we 
stated: 
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Despite the best intentions of designers, any model of the law and of the 
physical world is, by definition, a simplification. Environmental variables 
will fall outside the model and lead to error. Potholes develop, trees fall 
across roads, and streets become icy. Lack of context as well as absence of 
the traditional police officer’s domain knowledge is likely, and in some 
cases inevitable, due to lack of appropriate sensor data or inability to 
process higher level cognitive functions in software.70  
We noted that “[a] robotic car . . . might slide through a stop sign due 
to snow and possibly record that it did stop because the wheels 
stopped turning. Or the car might drive 15 MPH on a freeway 
because a repair crew forgot to take down an RFID-enabled 
construction zone sign.”71
Fully automated systems lack the ability to contextualize 
alleged crimes. For instance, violating speed limits and traffic signals 
might in some cases be not only morally justified but potentially 
even obligated, for the protection of life or limb perhaps.  
In a very helpful essay, Professor Patrick Lin explored the 
limits of automated decision-making and the importance of context 
in these decisions for driverless vehicles. Lin began: 
If a small tree branch pokes out onto a highway and there’s no incoming 
traffic, we’d simply drift a little into the opposite lane and drive around it. 
But an automated car might come to a full stop, as it dutifully observes 
traffic laws that prohibit crossing a double-yellow line. This unexpected 
move would avoid bumping the object in front, but then cause a crash with 
the human drivers behind it.  
Should we trust robotic cars to share our road, just because they are 
programmed to obey the law and avoid crashes?72
Lin argued: 
Our laws are ill-equipped to deal with the rise of these vehicles . . . . For 
example, is it enough for a robot car to pass a human driving test? In 
licensing automated cars as street-legal, some commentators believe that 
it’d be unfair to hold manufacturers to a higher standard than humans, that 
is, to make an automated car undergo a much more rigorous test than a 
new teenage driver.73  
According to Lin,  
[T]here are important differences between humans and machines that 
could warrant a stricter test. For one thing, we’re reasonably confident that 
                                                     
70. SHAY ET AL., supra note 35, at 25.  
71. Id.  
72. Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-
autonomous-cars/280360/.  
73. Id.  
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human drivers can exercise judgment in a wide range of dynamic
situations that don’t appear in a standard 40-minute driving test; we 
presume they can act ethically and wisely.74  
Lin also sees the potential problem from automating legal 
compliance, stating:  
[B]ecause the legal framework for autonomous vehicles does not yet exist, 
we have the opportunity to build one that is informed by ethics. This will 
be the challenge in creating laws and policies that govern automated cars: 
We need to ensure they make moral sense. Programming a robot car to 
slavishly follow the law, for instance, might be foolish and dangerous.75  
Designers are charged with creating a system that responds 
appropriately to contextual variations. For the time being, these 
systems have a limited capacity to make such nuanced distinctions.76
Prioritizing human discretion through conserved inefficiency and 
indeterminacy will ensure that a partially automated law enforcement 
system is adaptable and capable of fine-grained decisions based upon 
various contexts. 
2. Mitigating Harm 
In previous research, we documented the harm that can come 
from improperly automated law enforcement. We stated: 
Any automated law enforcement system must be sure to institute 
procedural safeguards against automation bias and due process violations, 
as well as ensuring an opportunity to appeal punishment. Additionally, 
automated law enforcement systems should be designed to minimize their 
enormous potential to commit egregious privacy violations under the 
Fourth Amendment, electronic surveillance regimes, and other privacy 
laws.77
Automation bias refers to the human tendency to irrationally 
trust automated decisions. Professor Danielle Citron has noted:  
Studies show that human beings rely on automated decisions even when 
they suspect system malfunction. The impulse to follow a computer’s
recommendation flows from human “automation bias”—the “use of 
                                                     
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Farivar, Perfect Enforcement, supra note 10; Matt Richtel 
& Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run into Problem: Cars with 
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/ technology/ 
personaltech/google-says-its-not-the-driverless-cars-fault-its-other-drivers.html?_r=0.
77. SHAY ET AL., supra note 10, at 34 (citing Kenneth A. Bamberger, 
Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV.
669 (2010); Citron, supra note 45. 
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automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and 
processing.” Automation bias effectively turns a computer program’s
suggested answer into a trusted final decision.78  
The privacy of individuals is potentially threatened by nearly 
every automated law enforcement system capability. While the most 
obvious threat to privacy might be the pervasive surveillance enabled 
by ubiquitous sensors, automated information analysis might also 
spark privacy concerns, particularly in the age of “big data,” where 
algorithms comb through piles of information for hidden or 
surprising correlations and inferences.79 Conserving inefficiency and 
indeterminacy will mitigate the harms from surveillance from a sheer 
reduction in scope and number of people surveilled. Inefficient 
surveillance requires prioritization about how to expend limited 
resources. Meanwhile, indeterminacy will mitigate the harms from 
erroneous data analysis by allowing humans to make sense of the 
complexity involved in understanding data and language. For 
example, IBM’s Watson has difficulty understanding slang and 
distinguishing between polite and impolite language.80
Conserving inefficiency and indeterminacy will also help 
mitigate harms to the freedom of expression. For example, consider 
the importance of countermeasures against surveillance. In exploring 
anti-mask laws and online real-name policies, Margot Kaminski 
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toronto-1.608022; Alexis C. Madrigal, IBM’s Watson Memorized the Entire ‘Urban 
Dictionary,’ Then His Overlords Had to Delete It, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2013), 
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the-entire-urban-dictionary-then-his-overlords-had-to-delete-it/267047/; Michal 
Lev-Ram, Teaching IBM’s Watson the Meaning of ‘OMG,’ FORTUNE (Jan. 7, 2013, 
10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2013/01/07/teaching-ibms-watson-the-meaning-of-
omg/. 
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asked, “Can the government impose a blanket ban on anonymity to 
thwart the masked and uncatchable bank robber, at the expense of 
the mask-wearing protester?”81 She concludes that “[a] blanket real-
world ban on anonymity . . . chills protected expression; and physical 
anonymity is becoming increasingly important in today’s
surveillance society.”82
Kaminski reaches a similar conclusion with respect to real-
name policies.83 The power of anonymity has grown exponentially 
over the past decade with the government employment of facial 
recognition software within existing surveillance systems.84 The 
mask, then, becomes a powerful countermeasure by hiding the 
wearer’s identity not only from the gaze of the police officer and the 
looming camera, but also from the probing software and its 
impressive searching and archiving capacities. Veiled identity on the 
Internet likewise thwarts the gaze of the NSA and cyber law 
enforcers, but technology is increasingly capable of circumventing 
attempts at anonymity, as has been recently revealed by the release 
of the Snowden documents.85
Consider, for instance, Seattle city officials’ debate to use $1.6 
million of federal grant money to purchase a city-wide surveillance 
system that includes state-of-the-art facial recognition software.86
This grant, available under the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Urban Area Security Initiative, would allow for enhanced 
surveillance across the Emerald City:  
Those Department of Homeland Security dollars would let the Seattle 
police pay for software that digitally scans surveillance camera footage 
and then tries to match images of the individuals caught on tape with any 
one of the 350,000-or-so people who have been photographed previously 
by King County, Washington law enforcement.87  
81. Kaminski, supra note 60, at 818.
82. Id.
83. These are policies that websites like Facebook place in their terms of
use agreements that prohibit users from using a pseudonym or require them to use 
their legal name. Id. at 879. 
84. Id. at 890.
85. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). 
86. Seattle Considering $1.6 Million Facial Recognition Surveillance
System, RT (Feb. 20, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.rt.com/usa/seattle-surveillance-
dhs-grant-943. 
87. Id.
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Privacy advocates are understandably concerned about the 
potential harm of such an intelligent system.88 Other cities across the 
U.S., such as San Diego and Daytona Beach, have already 
successfully fielded software-enhanced surveillance systems.89
Whereas now humans are involved in the processing and screening 
of the captured images, the potential exists for the system to become 
fully automated in the not-so-distant future. The proliferation of 
countermeasures—masked and otherwise—is inevitable given this 
exponential increase in surveillance scope and power.  
3. Social Development and Inhibitor of Perfect Enforcement
Deterministic law enforcement systems with negligible 
transaction costs per attempt raise the possibility of perfect 
enforcement of law—as a relatively attainable goal if not a reality. In 
previous research we noted that any automated system must 
ultimately confront the question: “How many violations of the law 
should be explicitly forgiven or ignored?”90 Where discretion focuses 
on the preservation or elimination of individual contextual judgment, 
the perfection-of-enforcement question requires system-level 
determinations of when to ignore legal violations. Should any or all 
laws be perfectly enforced? If not, what is the proper “tolerance” for 
the system?  
If perfect enforcement is possible, that is, an ex ante decision 
for zero tolerance for legal violations, the temptation to embrace 
perfection is strong. As Jonathan Zittrain noted, “Few would choose 
to tolerate a murder, making it a good candidate for preemption 
through design, were that possible.”91 In exploring “impossibility 
structures” for enforcing various laws, Michael Rich noted: 
Preventing drunk driving is a low hanging fruit when it comes to making 
criminal conduct impossible. The crime requires technology for its 
completion and is essentially defined by a technological measurement. 
Thus, adapting automotive technology to incorporate the measurement of 
88. Id.
89. See Dave Maass, Going to San Diego Comic-Con? Put On Your Mask
for the Surveillance Camera Network, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 22, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/operation-secure-san-diego; THE CITY OF 
DAYTONA BEACH, OFFICE OF THE PURCHASING AGENT, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS:
INVITATION 10 (2014), http://purchasing.codb.us/documents/RFP%200415-3630% 
20Video%20Surveillance.pdf. 
90. See SHAY ET AL., supra note 35.
91. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP 
IT 120 (2008). 
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the driver’s BAL is intuitive, if not technologically simple. Moreover, the 
harms resulting from drunk driving are severe and widespread, making 
[this] more politically feasible than other potential impossibility 
structures.92
Yet we caution strongly against a goal of perfect enforcement, 
particularly through a zero-tolerance strategy of automated ex post 
punishment. Even impossibility structures are problematic. As Rich 
noted with respect to drunk driving, “[E]ven . . . a straightforward 
impossibility structure gives rise to a tangle of constitutional, legal, 
and policy issues. These issues likely will only multiply as the 
targets of impossibility structures migrate outward from this natural 
origin of technology-related crimes.”93 Rich continued: 
[A] few areas seem ripe for the introduction of impossibility structures. 
The first would be other offenses involving the operation of automobiles, 
such as speeding, running a red light, or failing to wear a seat belt, that can 
result in death and serious bodily harm. From a technological standpoint, 
these should be easy to make impossible, and much of the technology 
needed to do so is already under development. . . . Crimes that take place 
over the Internet, such as cyberbullying and cyberstalking, hacking, 
distributing child pornography, and theft of intellectual property, may also 
be amenable to impossibility structures in that they require technology for 
their commission. Although such crimes are disparate in how they are 
committed, and thus how they might be rendered impossible, they give 
rise to some common concerns.94
Inefficiency and indeterminism are perhaps most important in 
light of the long-term implications of automated law enforcement. 
Beyond specific circumstances where legal violations might be 
excused, certain countermeasures and the ability to break the law are 
necessary for social growth and stability. Preventing perfect 
enforcement through inefficiency and indeterminacy preserves this 
necessary breathing space for society to thrive. In short, a perfected 
system does not necessarily equate to perfect justice in our humane 
understanding of the concept.  
4. The Cost of Conservation and Benefits of Automation
However, there are incentives that work against this principle, 
including the desire to reduce the cost of law enforcement (or even 
profit from it). Red-light cameras produce considerable revenue for 
92. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 795, 846-47 (2013). 
93. Id. at 847.
94. Id.
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cities that employ them.95 For example, Philadelphia earned 
$17 million in fines from red-light cameras in 2013.96 And these 
cameras never take a day off, never get sick, have no need for 
medical insurance, and will never draw a pension when they are 
replaced. 
A conservation approach will often mean preserving police 
discretion, which has acknowledged problems.97 Elizabeth Joh has 
noted:  
While harboring stereotypes is not a characteristic peculiar to the police, 
the authority delegated to the police makes stereotyping especially 
dangerous in that profession. . . . As many have observed, the harms of 
this abuse of police discretion extend beyond the wasted time and 
annoyance of minority drivers. It is a demoralizing experience for an 
individual to be singled out primarily due to race or ethnicity. When 
repeated hundreds or thousands of times against members of a particular 
racial or ethnic group, however, these experiences alienate the entire 
affected community.98
Joh explored the value of automating away police discretion, 
stating that “the effects of a widespread automated enforcement 
regime would be dramatic.”99 As an example, Joh noted that “[t]raffic 
stops are often pretextual, a means for discovering evidence of other 
crimes unrelated to the justification for the initial stop. Thus, if 
traffic stops were eliminated through widespread automated 
enforcement, the nature of policing could be drastically different.”100
Those applying the conservation theory to automated enforcement 
should be mindful of the advantages of eliminating discretion in 
certain areas or in certain ways.  
D. Applying the Theory 
When this ideal system is decomposed into its component 
parts—the iterative steps of an automated legal process—room does 
of course exist at certain carefully considered points for the 
precision, comprehensiveness, and rigor offered by automated 
technology. These questions then arise: Where in the process could 
95. See Walker, supra note 49, at 243; Clark, supra note 46.
96. Emily Babay, Grace Period Ends for West Oak Lane Red-Light
Cameras, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:24 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/ 
news/Grace_period_ends_for_West_Oak_Lane_red-light_cameras.html. 
97. Joh, supra note 43, at 208.
98. Id. at 208, 211 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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or should automation trump human decision? To what extent can it 
go unchecked, if at all? And how do we keep techno-creep—our 
slow but steady relinquishment of control to technology101—from 
overriding what is necessarily a human-designed and governed 
system controlled through continually regulated checks and 
balances?  
The theory of governance for the automated enforcement of the 
law proposed here aims to answer these questions by focusing on 
reallocation of inefficiency and indeterminism. When one aspect of a 
law enforcement process (surveillance, analysis, or action) is 
automated to increase efficiency and determinism, inefficiency and 
indeterminacy should generally be explicitly preserved elsewhere in 
the process to prevent harms from automation. Automating 
surveillance, analysis, or action makes it important to ensure that 
inefficiency or indeterminism is correspondingly preserved or 
introduced into the rest of the system to protect social welfare and 
prevent societal harm.  
Where inefficiency and indeterminism are reallocated will 
entirely be dependent upon context, making this a general theory that 
is broadly applicable but in need of refinement in specific 
circumstances. Generally speaking, inefficiency and indeterminism 
can be conserved instantaneously at the point of surveillance, 
analysis, or action, or after the fact—as a backstop in the appeals 
process, for example.  
Consider red-light cameras. In journalist Cyrus Farivar’s in-
depth exploration into red-light cameras for Ars Technica, he 
investigated the installation and use of red-light cameras by the 
commercial vendor Redflex in Modesto, California.102 He 
interviewed a police officer who reviewed the tickets, writing:  
Modesto Police officer Steve Silva, a 34-year police veteran who 
personally approves each ticket, denies about 20 percent of the cases that 
the Redflex system presents to him. “I have to see a good violation,” he 
told me. “If I can’t identify the driver, the picture is too bad quality . . .
sometimes there’s a big vehicle blocking the limit line, sometimes it’s just 
real close, and I’ll dismiss it because any doubt goes to the citizens, 100 
percent.”  
Each morning when Silva arrives at work, Redflex usually has data on 
40 cars that might have run the cameras. Line by line, day by day, Silva 
checks each entry on the Redflex website. Was the car over the line? Was 
101. See generally Thomas P. Keenan, TECHNO CREEP: THE SURRENDER OF 
PRIVACY AND THE CAPITALIZATION OF INTIMACY (2014).  
102. Farivar, Perfect Enforcement, supra note 10.
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the light red? Was the photo clear? Does the photo of the driver match 
DMV records? This task takes him a few painstaking hours each day to go 
through completely.103
In some instances, a regulatory response can be used to 
conserve inefficiency and indeterminacy. For example, Iowa City 
drafted a municipal ordinance that reads: 
The City shall not: . . . Use any automatic traffic surveillance system or 
device, automatic license plate recognition system or device, or domestic 
drone system or device for the enforcement of a qualified traffic law 
violation, unless a peace officer or Parking Enforcement Attendant is 
present at the scene, witnesses the event, and personally issues the ticket to 
the alleged violator at the time and location of the vehicle.104  
Iowa City embraced the conservation theory by injecting both 
inefficiency and indeterminacy not simply “in the loop,” but at the 
geographic locus of surveillance, action, and enforcement.  
CONCLUSION
As red-light cameras and radar speed traps have demonstrated, 
technology already exists for automating all parts of the automated 
law enforcement process outlined in this Article: surveillance, 
analysis, and action. Fortunately, these examples impose only 
relatively minor civil penalties—they are a far cry from the fictional 
character “Robocop.” Failures in the system will be annoying to the 
innocent victim, but not catastrophic. However, robots are used in 
law enforcement applications, and as Knightscope’s K5 robot 
demonstrated, this is just the initial entry point into a potentially 
large and lucrative market. As we have seen, automation of 
surveillance has become widespread, and automation of analysis and 
action are increasingly common. The improvements in technology 
and the economic incentive to replace people with computers and 
robots form powerful arguments in favor of completely automated 
law enforcement systems. But arguments based on greater efficiency, 
reduced cost, and even reduced bias must be evaluated holistically, 
especially with regard to the overall effect of ubiquitous automated 
law enforcement systems on society.  
This Article examined the societal harms from overreliance on 
automation at any stage in the automated law enforcement process 
and especially the full automation of the entire process. Writers from 
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Plato to Patrick Lin warn against rigid enforcement of laws that were 
never intended to cover every possible contingency in every 
situation.  
This Article proposed a theory to govern the automation of the 
law enforcement process. The theory states that whenever 
automation is introduced or expanded in one part of the automated 
law enforcement process in order to increase efficiency and 
determinacy, inefficiency and indeterminacy should generally be 
proportionally and explicitly preserved elsewhere in the process to 
prevent harms from automation. Although perhaps counterintuitive, 
we assert that indeterminacy and inefficiency are necessary and 
desirable components of any automated law enforcement process, 
not weaknesses in the system.  
Once adopted, automated systems become entrenched and 
difficult to modify, so the initial design and implementation of 
automated law enforcement systems must preserve an adequate 
amount of indeterminacy and inefficiency. Given the effect 
automated law enforcement systems can have on our core interests of 
freedom, autonomy, due process, and privacy, there is simply too 
much at stake to place cost and efficiency above all other concerns. 
